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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
by
Tom Needham*

I.

GOOD CAUSE

TRICT compliance with the requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) that a claimant give notice to his employer within
thirty days after an injury or first manifestation of an occupational
disease and that he file a claim with the Industrial Accident Board (the
Board) within one year may be waived for good cause in meritorious cases.'
The Act does not define good cause, but the accepted standard is whether
the employee exercised the same degree of diligence as that of an ordinary
prudent person similarly situated. 2 In Applegate v. Home Indemnity Co. 3 the
jury found that an employee failed to give notice of his injury within thirty
days and that the employee believed that his injury was not job-related. The
jury further determined that the employee's belief was not good cause for the
delay. Following the entry of a take-nothing judgment, the employee appealed. One point of error was that the jury's failure to find good cause was
in conflict with the jury's finding that the employee believed his injury was
not job related. 4 The Applegate court affirmed the trial court's judgment,
holding that no conflict existed. 5 Since good cause is an objective test, the
jury could have reasonably inferred that a prudent person would have realized that his injury was job related before the statutory time period had
elapsed. This finding therefore does not conflict with the jury's finding of the
6
employee's subjective belief.
II.

ELECTION OF REMEDIES

A worker may waive his workers' compensation claim if he makes an informed choice to pursue a course of action that is so inconsistent with his
workers' compensation claim as to constitute manifest injustice should he be
granted workers' compensation benefits. 7 In Overstreet v. Home Indemnity
*

J.D., Baylor University School of Law. Attorney at Law, Ford, Needham & Johnson,

P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4A (Vernon Supp. 1987) (establishing time
limits as to notice of injury and claims for compensation).
2. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Jaques, 131 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.).
3. 705 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ dism'd).

4. Id. at 158.
5. Id. at 159.
6. Id.
7. Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex. 1980).
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Co.8 the Texas Supreme Court reversed the lower court's holding that a
worker could not pursue a workers' compensation claim due to his election
to obtain group insurance benefits. 9 The lower court based its holding on a
set of requests that the court deemed admitted.10 In a per curiam decision
the Texas Supreme Court held that the admissions did not establish an informed election.11 This holding underscores the fact that the injured worker
must do considerably more than sign and file a group insurance application
for benefits and receive benefits in order to establish an election of remedies.
The supreme court reversed and remanded for the court of appeals to determine whether additional theories of waiver, estoppel, or ratification had been
established. 12
On remand the court of appeals in Overstreet v. Home Indemnity Co. 13
held that when a worker is unable to know whether injuries are work related
prior to a jury verdict, the worker is not precluded from bringing a workers'
compensation claim even though he has claimed and received group medical
benefits. 14 The court noted that in Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 15
the supreme court held that the theories of waiver, estoppel, and ratification
were merely variations of the broader doctrine of election. 16 The Overstreet
court concluded that when the broader defense of election has not been established, the narrower defenses cannot logically be held to have been
established. 17
III.

COURSE AND SCOPE

To establish a compensable injury a worker must show that the injury
occurred in the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer and
that the injury was of the kind and character that originated in or related to
the employer's business.1 8 As a general rule, an injury received while traveling to and from work is not compensable because such travel is not within
the course of employment. 19 Several exceptions modify the general rule,
such as when the means of transportation is a part of the worker's employment contract, is paid by the employer, or is controlled by the employer, or
when the employer directs the employee to proceed from one place to
20
another.
8. 678 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam).
9. Id. at 916.
10. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 169 (subject of request for admission deemed admitted if not
answered within period of the rule).
11. 678 S.W.2d at 916.
12. Id.
13. 696 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985), writ ref'd n.r.e. percuriam, 704 S.W.2d 14
(Tex. 1986).
14. 696 S.W.2d at 190.
15. 605 S.W.2d 848, 850-51 (Tex. 1980).
16. 696 S.W.2d at 189.
17. Id.

18. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
19. See Janak v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 381 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex. 1964).
20. Id. at 179 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (Vernon 1967)).
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In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Eberstein2 1 the beneficiaries of a
worker sought recovery of workers' compensation death benefits arising
from a fatal automobile accident. The worker was the sole employee of a
professional corporation, and the corporation provided the automobile that
he was driving at the time of the accident. The Eberstein court noted that
although the facts may bring transportation within the purview of article
8309, section lb, the requirements of section 1 of that article must still be
met. 22 The court held that the worker's travel was not in the furtherance of
his employer's business and thus not in the course of his employment. 23 The
court reasoned that the mere gratituous furnishing of transportation would
not bring an otherwise noncompensable injury occurring during travel
24
within the protection of the Act.
The general rule that the Act does not apply to injuries received going to
and from work does not apply when an employer intends workers to use a
particular route to go to and from work and the route is so closely related to
25
the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of those premises.
This exception is known as the access doctrine. 26 In Turner v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association 27 the court considered whether a worker's injury came within the purview of the access doctrine. The worker was
injured in an automobile collision while crossing a parking lot owned by her
employer in order to gain access to a public parking lot not owned by her
employer. Her jobsite was several blocks from the place of injury. The Turner court held that under these facts her injuries were not received within a
reasonable time and distance from the place where her work was to be
done. 28 The court concluded that it would require an unreasonable extension of the access doctrine in order to bring the worker's injuries within the
purview of the access doctrine.29
IV.

INJURY

v. Blancas30

Home Insurance Co.
involved the admissibility of certain evidence in order to prove that a worker had sustained a compensable injury as
a result of lung disease. A medical doctor testified as to the examination and
21. 711 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. Id. at 357.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Texas Compensation Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 519 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Tex. 1974) (route
"so closely related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the premises").
26. Id.; Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 645 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Dean, 604 S.W.2d 346, 349
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Lee, 596 S.W.2d 942,
943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ); Stoudt v. International Ins. Co., 568 S.W.2d 904,
905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Woods, 449
S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Kelty v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 391 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27. 715 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd).
28. Id. at 54 (injuries must be within "reasonable margin of time and space").
29. Id. at 55.
30. 713 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
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treatment of two of the employee's co-workers. Her opinion as to the employees' condition was, at least in part, based upon prior examination and
treatment of the co-workers. 3' The evidence revealed that the employee had
been exposed over a long period of time to the same conditions as his coworkers. The doctor testified that in light of the condition of the co-workers'
lungs it would be almost impossible for the claimant not to be similarly affected. The Blancas court held that the evidence was properly admitted for
the purpose of showing the probability that the worker had contracted a
32
lung disease made the basis of his claim for compensation.
In Austin Independent School Districtv. Maynard33 the employer argued
that a worker's injuries were the result of his engaging in injurious practices.
The Act states that where an employee persists in insanitary or injurious
practices that imperil or retard his recovery, his compensation may be partially or wholly withheld. 34 The school district claimed that the worker's
failure to lose excessive weight following an injury to his back constituted
such an injurious practice. The trial court disregarded jury answers
favorable to the school district and entered judgment in favor of the worker.
Because the school district had failed to request a special issue on whether
the worker's failure to lose weight was willful, 3 5 the court held that the omitted element of the school district's defense would be deemed found against
36
the school district.
V.

HEART ATTACK

Heart attacks have long been recognized by Texas courts as compensable
under certain circumstances. 37 A claim for compensation following a heart
attack may be predicated upon physical exertion, mental stress traceable to a
definite time, place, and cause, or upon repetitive traumatic physical activities.3 8 In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Courtney39 a worker's
beneficiaries sought death benefits following a worker's fatal heart attack.
The carrier asserted that there was no probative evidence that the worker
experienced any particular exertion while on the job that could have caused
his heart attack. The evidence revealed that the worker had lifted the lid of
31. Id. at 194.
32. Id. at 195.
33. 711 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).

34. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4 (Vernon 1967).
35. 711 S.W.2d at 379. Whether a claimant's action is willful is an essential element of
the carrier's defense under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4 (Vernon 1967).
36. 711 S.W.2d at 380.
37. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 448 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Calhoun, 426 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mid-Western Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 370 S.W.2d 779,
783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963, writ ref'd).
38. Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. 1976); Baird v. Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex. 1973); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Reardon, 695
S.W.2d 758, 760 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ); Blair v. INA, 686 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Kiel v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 679
S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1984, no writ).
39. 709 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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a tool box that weighed approximately two and one-half pounds and immediately thereafter collapsed. A doctor testified that the worker suffered from
severe pre-existing coronary artery disease. He further testified that any
amount of increased activity can cause a heart attack and that it was medically probable that lifting the tool box lid precipitated this worker's heart
attack.4° A doctor testifying for the insurance carrier stated that raising the
tool box lid could not have precipitated a heart attack, although he conceded
on cross examination that the stress level necessary to trigger a heart attack
was relative to the extent of a patient's pre-existing arterial disease.4 1 Affirming the judgment in favor of the worker's beneficiary, the Courtney court
noted that although this particular task may not have been a great physical
strain or exertion, the requisite strain or exertion may be less for someone
42
suffering from a pre-existing circulatory problem.
The Courtney court's liberal construction of strain or exertion is consistent
with the interpretations of other courts, including the Texas Supreme Court,
in passing upon what activities are deemed sufficient physical exertion to
produce a compensable injury. These courts have held that the exertion or
strain necessary to produce a compensable injury is that degree of exertion
that is in fact a contributing cause of the heart attack.4 3 The Courtney court
further stated that a claimant must establish that a specific event caused the
44
heart attack and must trace the event to a definite time, place, and cause.
The worker in Courtney was not relying upon repetitious traumatic physical
activities to establish a compensable heart attack. In such cases, the injury
develops gradually and without a specific cause or incident. 45
VI.

WAGE RATE

The injured worker bears the burden of establishing an average weekly
wage under one of three methods set forth by the Act. 46 Each method em40. Id. at 383.
41.

Id.

42. Id.; see Continental Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 506 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. Cir. App.-El
Paso 1974, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Brown, 622 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex. App.El Paso 1981), af'd, 635 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1982).
43. Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex. 1976) (operating hoist
caused sufficient strain); Board v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207, 211 (Tex.
1973) (installing electrical conduit caused strain); Royal Ins. Co. v. Goad, 677 S.W.2d 795, 802
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (climbing two flights of stairs was sufficient
exertion); Northbrook Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 676 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (exertion turning a steering wheel to avoid collision was
sufficient exertion); Sun Belt Ins. Co. v. Childress, 640 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1982, no writ) (driving a truck was sufficient strain); Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Dickie,
609 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (sawing lumber was sufficient strain); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 448 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (operating tractor was sufficient strain); Midwestern Ins. Co.
v. Wagner, 370 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (climbing
in and out of vehicle was sufficient strain).
44. 709 S.W.2d at 384.
45. Davis v. Employers' Ins., 694 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
46. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
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braces an arbitrary standard to establish a basis for which an award can be
calculated. If the worker has worked 210 days or more in the same or similar employment during the year immediately preceding his injury, then his
own wages are the standard. 47 If he has not, but other employees of the
same class have worked at least 210 days in a similar employment in the
same or neighboring place during the year immediately prior to the worker's
injury, then other employee's wages may be used to determine the applicable
wage rate.48 If neither of these two methods is applicable, then the standard
49
is a wage rate that is just and fair to both the worker and the employer.
These methods are mutually exclusive. The worker cannot resort to the second method to establish wage rate until the applicability of the first method
is eliminated from the case, nor resort to the just and fair method without
eliminating the applicability of the first and second methods. 50 While this
statutory scheme appears simple, its application in practice creates considerable procedural difficulties.5"
In Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Richards5 2 the court considered
the correct method of submitting wage rate when the worker is a part-time
employee. The court addressed the question of whether the term "day" as
used in the Act means a full eight-hour day or whether it means any day on
which an employee worked, regardless of the number of hours.5 3 The
worker's payroll records revealed that she had worked at least 240 days during the one year immediately preceding the injury. Only a few of these days
were full eight-hour days, however. The majority were four-hour days. The
Richards court noted that under the Act an employee is not compensated for
loss of earnings, but rather, for loss of earning capacity calculated at a rate
based on his or her earning capacity when employed full time.5 4 The Richards court held that if an employee works less than eight-hour days, his
average weekly wage should be calculated by the method prescribed in article 8309, section 1(2) or, if that is not possible, then the court should use the
method prescribed in article 8309, section 1(3). 55 Although the court did
not specifically state its definition of the term "day," by implication it has
defined the term to mean a full, eight-hour day.
47. id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Holliman v. Leander Indep. School Dist., 679 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Tex. App.-Austin
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
52. 704 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
54. 704 S.W.2d at 402 (citing Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Clack, 132 S.W.2d 399 (Tex.
1939); Lubbock Indep. School Dist. v. Bradley, 579 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
55. Id. at 402; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(2), (3) (Vernon 1967).
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VII.

PARTIAL INCAPACITY

In Gauthierv. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 56 a jury found that a worker

had sustained a $100 per week loss of earning capacity during a period of
partial incapacity. The trial court disregarded the jury's finding on the basis
that no evidence supported the diminution in average weekly earning capacity and entered judgment n.o.v. in favor of the carrier. The Gauthiercourt
reversed and remanded, instructing the trial court to enter judgment on the
verdict, and holding that a claimant need not introduce direct evidence of
disability resulting in a reduction of earning capacity, but may establish such
disability by circumstantial evidence upon the testimony of lay witnesses
alone. 57 The court further noted that because such damages are uncertain,
58
the court should allow the jury great latitude in awarding compensation.
Upon rehearing 59 the court withdrew its prior opinion 6° and reversed and
remanded the matter for a new trial. 61 The Gauthiercourt reconsidered its
prior holding in light of the Texas Supreme Court's decision of Texas Employers'InsuranceAssociation v. Lara.62 The supreme court held in Lara that
because the court did not submit the issue of the wage rate before injury to
the jury and the jury was not informed of a stipulated wage rate, it had no
basis from which it could determine a reduction in earning capacity in compliance with the court's instructions. 63 The Gauthiercourt noted that in the
case before it the facts were similar to those in Lara, in that the parties had
stipulated an average weekly wage rate but the rate was never revealed to the
jury. Thus the Gauthier court concluded that, as in Lara, the jury had no
basis from which it could reach a determination of the worker's reduction in
earning capacity. 64
In Lozano v. Vigilant Insurance Co. 6 5 a trial court entered a take nothing
judgment against a worker because the jury found his average weekly earning capacity during partial incapacity to be an amount equal to his stipulated
weekly wage earning capacity prior to the injury. On appeal the worker
asserted that the jury's finding of partial incapacity and its finding of no
reduction in earning capacity were in conflict. The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's action because the record before the court failed to contain
the stipulation of the parties as to average weekly wage. 66 In dictum, however, the Lozano court stated that a workers' compensation claimant can be
56. 704 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985), opinion withdrawn, 720

S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
57. 704 S.W.2d at 379.
58. Id.
59. 720 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
60. Id. at 175.
61. Id. at 177.
62. 711 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. 1986).
63. Id. at 225. The difference between average weekly wage before injury and average
weekly earning capacity during partial incapacity determines plaintiff's average weekly earning
capacity during partial incapacity. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 11 (Vernon Supp.
1987) sets out this formula.
64. 720 S.W.2d at 176.
65. 714 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. Id. at 394.
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partially disabled without suffering a reduction in earning capacity. 67 The
Lozano court cited Gonzales v. Texas Employers' InsuranceAssociation 68 as
authority for this proposition. 69 The holding of the Gonzales case, as reiterated by the Lozano court, is dependent, however, upon the particular definition of partial disability submitted to the jury. 70 The holding would not
appear to be applicable when the definition of partial incapacity contained in
71
Texas Pattern Jury Charges is submitted to the jury.

VIII.

DEATH CLAIMS

If an employee's death results from a compensable injury, a claim for benefits arises under the Act in favor of the worker's legal beneficiaries. 72 In
Antwine v. DallasIndependent School District73 a worker sustained an injury
during the course of his employment. During the pendency of the worker's
claim for benefits under the Act, he died, and the independent executrix of
his estate was substituted as plaintiff. The school district filed a motion for
summary judgment alleging that it had paid all workers' compensation benefits accruing from the date of injury until the date of death. The trial court
granted the school district's motion for summary judgment. In affirming the
judgment, the Antwine court stated that it is settled law that unaccrued
workers' compensation benefits terminate with the death of an injured
worker if the injury is general and no final judgment has been entered on the
claim. 74 On appeal the executrix had contended that an issue existed as to
whether the worker's death was work related and thus summary judgment
was improper. 75 The Antwine court noted, however, that a suit for death
benefits under the Act is distinct from a claim for workers' compensation
benefits. 76 If a worker dies following an on-the-job injury, and if the death is
thought to be work related, a new and independent proceeding under the
77
Act must be instituted on behalf of the proper beneficiaries.

IX.

FUTURE MEDICAL CARE

When a worker receives a compensable injury, the Act requires the carrier
to furnish medical services to the worker. 78 The duty to furnish medical
services usually continues after the issue of monetary compensation is concluded. 79 In the event of a final Board award or a judgment in favor of the
67. Id.
68. 419 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, no writ).
69. 714 S.W.2d at 394.
70. 419 S.W.2d at 206.
71. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES PJC 22.02 (1970).
72. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
73. 698 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. Id. at 228.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
78. Id. § 7.
79. A Board award, a judgment adverse to the claimant, or a settlement could terminate
such duty.
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worker, the carrier's duty to furnish reasonable and necessary medical services incurred as a result of the injury lasts for the pendency of the worker's
life.80 When a claim is concluded by a compromise settlement agreement,
either before the Board or before the district court, provisions for the carrier
to provide future medical care, or open medical, for a period of time is
8
customary. '
In Ryan v. Travelers Insurance Co. 82 a worker had obtained a district
court judgment relating to an on-the-job injury. Subsequently, during January 1983, the worker incurred additional medical expenses related to the onthe-job injury. He filed a claim with the Industrial Accident Board to recover these expenses in February 1983. The Board's final award was not
made until April 23, 1984. The carrier alleged that the Board did not have
jurisdiction under the Act to enter the award. The Act provides that the
Board has jurisdiction over claims such that it may render successive awards
to a worker for expenses arising six months prior to the date of each successive award. 83 The trial court granted the carrier's motion for summary judgment and discharged the carrier except for medical
expenses incurred within
84
the six months preceding the Board's award.
The Ryan court noted that this was a case of first impression and that
legislative intent must be considered by the court in interpreting this provision of the Act. 85 The legislature has stated that the purpose of the Act is to
provide prompt and fair workers' compensation payments to injured workers, to minimize the expense and delay to the claimant; and to provide an
equitable system allowing the injured worker the maximum recovery. 86 The
court noted that the Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its primary purposes of benefiting injured workers and encouraging settlement of
valid claims. 87 The court further noted that provisions of a statutory scheme
should be construed consistently with the other provisions. 88 The court
stated that the strict construction of section 5 urged by the carrier would
place an unreasonable burden upon the claimant, the Board, and the court
system.8 9 Thus, the Ryan court construed the language of section 5 to require a claim every six months, as opposed to requiring the Board to enter an
award each six months. 90 This construction is consistent with the purposes
and other provisions of the Act. 9 1
In King v. Texas Employers' InsuranceAssociation 92 a worker entered into
80. Id. § 7.

81. Id.
82. 715 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
83. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1987) (Board procedure).

84. 715 S.W.2d at 174.
85. Id. at 175.
86. Id. (citing Acts of 1969, ch. 18, § 1, 61st Leg. 48).
87. Id. (citing Stott v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 645 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. 1983)).
88. Id. (citing Black v. American Bankers Ins. Co., 478 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1972)).
89. Id. at 176.

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 716 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
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a compromise settlement agreement that provided that the carrier would
provide future medical expenses for ten years. The district court approved
the compromise settlement agreement by an agreed judgment. Subsequently, the worker incurred medical expenses that the carrier failed to pay.
The worker filed suit for breach of contract in district court. The carrier
filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging lack of jurisdiction in the
district court. The trial court granted the carrier's motion for summary
judgment.
On appeal the worker argued that the matter had not been presented to
the Board because the worker could not force the carrier to comply with the
provisions of the Act. 9 3 Article 8307, section 12b provides that whenever a
dispute arises concerning the payment of medical expenses provided for in
an agreed judgment, the dispute shall be presented to the Board within six
months of the time when a written refusal for payment of expenses has been
filed with the Board. 94 The worker contended that the carrier could circumvent section 12b by refusing to make a written refusal of payment. In affirming the court's summary judgment in favor of the carrier, the King court
noted that it is unreasonable to believe that the legislature imposed a requirement on a worker to present a claim to the Board while at the same time
providing the carrier with the power to prevent such presentation by withholding written refusals of payment. 9 5 The King court held that the filing of
a written notification by the worker with the Board of the carrier's refusal to
make payment would satisfy the requirements of section 12b and allow a
worker to obtain a final ruling from the Board. 96 The worker could then
appeal the ruling, if he so chose, under the provisions of section 5 of article
8307 of the Act.
In ,Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Marshall97 the court addressed the
question of whether Texas law recognizes a cause of action by a worker
against the carrier arising out of the carrier's handling of medical claims
during a post-judgment period. The Marshall court, in affirming a judgment
rendered in favor of the worker, held that a cause of action for the handling
of open medical claims under a workers' compensation agreed judgment exists both under the insurer's duty of good faith and fair dealing toward the
insured and under article 21.21.98
X.

COURT'S CHARGE

In Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hannah99 the
court considered how to word an issue correctly in order to submit the ques93. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12b (Vernon Supp. 1987).

94.
95.
96.
97.
1987).
98.
99.

Id.
716 S.W.2d at 183.
Id.
699 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1985), affid, 724 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.
Id. at 901; see TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon 1981).
701 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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tion of an employee's dual capacity to the jury. 1 The issue submitted to
the jury inquired as to whether at the time of the injury the worker was
performing the tasks of an ordinary workman in the course and scope of
employment for his employer as distinguished from his usual activities as a
corporate officer for his employer.101 The carrier's objection to the submitted issue was that the correct test was whether the worker was hired to perform both executive and employee-related duties, as opposed to inquiring
what tasks were actually being performed at the time of the injury. The
Hannah court agreed with the carrier's objection to the submitted issue and
reversed and remanded the matter for new trial.10 2
In Southerland v. Illinois Employers' Insurance Co. 103 a worker sustained
a compensable injury to his neck and back as a result of a fall. Subsequently,
while undergoing a diagnostic procedure in the hospital, the worker was insecurely strapped to an examining table, which was then rotated causing him
to fall to the floor and sustain additional injuries to his back. At trial the
worker requested the court to instruct the jury that the term "disability"
includes disability resulting from medical treatment instituted to cure or relieve an employee from the effects of his injury. 1 4 The court refused this
instruction, and the worker urged that such refusal constituted reversible
error.
On appeal the Southerlandcourt noted that the requested instruction was
clearly a correct statement of Texas law, which provides that disability resulting from medical treatment instituted to cure or relieve an employee
from the effects of an injury is properly compensable.105 Thus, the worker
would be entitled to compensation for any disability resulting from the medical treatment of the original injury that the jury might find. 106
Although the trial court has considerable discretion in deciding what instructions are proper, the critical issue is whether the failure to instruct the
jury was reasonably calculated to and probably did cause rendition of an
improper verdict. 107 The Southerland court, in reversing the judgment and
remanding the matter for trial, held that the requested instruction was essential because the separate aggravating factor was specifically compensable
under the law. 108

In Port Naches Independent School District v. Soignier109 a worker was
injured when he climbed from a scaffolding onto a basketball goal in order to
100. See Harris v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 632 S.W.2d 714, 715-18 (Tex. 1982) (discussing the dual capacity doctrine); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § la (Vernon Supp.
1987).
101. 701 S.W.2d at 68.
102. Id. at 69, 71.
103. 696 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
104. Id. at 141.
105. Id. (citing Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gonzalez, 518 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. 1975)).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Mobile Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1974); Minchen v. Rogers, 596 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1980, no writ)).
108. Id. at 142.
109. 702 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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reach a gym ceiling that he was painting. The carrier requested the trial
court to instruct the jury, in part, that if an employee violated instructions
intended to limit the scope of his employment, any injury he received while
violating those instructions would be outside the course and scope of employment. The trial court refused to submit the requested instruction and,
following a jury verdict, entered judgment in favor of the worker. In affirming the judgment' 10 the Soignier court followed the reasoning of Brown
v. Forum Insurance Co.,"'1 which held that an employee acting in furtherance of his employer's business but violating a rule regulating the manner
and method of performing the work was nonetheless still in the course and
scope of his employment.' 1 2
Mathis v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. 113 involved a worker who sustained four compensable back injuries during four consecutive years. The
worker's four claims were consolidated for trial. The jury found that each
injury was a producing cause of total and permanent incapacity. The jury
further found that the successive injuries had respectively contributed certain percentages to the worker's incapacity. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the worker on one injury and granted take-nothing
judgments against the worker on the remaining three injuries. 1 4 The
worker appealed the three take-nothing judgments.
By way of cross points the carrier contended that the four findings of total
and permanent incapacity and the findings of contribution were irreconcilably conflicting. In addressing the cross point, the Mathis court held that
contrary to the carrier's position, the Act does not contain language even
suggesting that a worker may recover only one award for total and permanent incapacity. " 5 The court noted that the carrier may raise the defense of
proportionate reduction if the evidence establishes that an earlier compensable general injury caused the incapacity underlying the claim. 11 6 The court
noted that this is an affirmative defense and that the burden of proof rests
upon the carrier to establish that previous injuries were compensable and
caused the current injury. 1 7 The carrier must also show the percentage of
contribution of the prior injury to the injury in dispute."i 8 The failure of the
carrier to do so operates as a waiver of that defense.' 1 9
In framing the issues to be used in submitting a carrier's section 12c defense, the Mathis court recommended the use of the issues set forth by Texas
Pattern Jury Charges.' 20 The court admonished, however, that the wording
110. Id. at 757.
111.
112.
113.
114.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
S.W.2d
120.

507 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
Id. at 578.
707 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 235.

Id. at 239.
Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon Supp. 1987)).
Id. at 240.
Id.
Id. at 241 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 279); see Denton Publishing Co. v. Boyd, 460
881 (Tex. 1970).
2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES PJC 25.05 (1970).
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of such issues is appropriate only when one
and that the wording must be appropriately
"to the incapacity found by you" when two
of the plaintiff's claim for compensation.1 2 1
1 22
findings immaterial.
XI.

injury is the subject of the suit
altered to exclude the language
or more injuries form the basis
Failure to do so will render the

WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

The Act provides that an employer may not terminate an employee for
pursuing a claim under the Act. 12 3 Should such a termination occur, the
employee is entitled to damages and reinstatement. 124 A worker pursuing a
claim under this section of the Act has the burden of establishing that the
employer's decision was due to the worker's having pursued a claim. 125 In
Hunt v. Van Der Horst Corp.126 a worker worked for an employer from January 1968 until he was fired on February 12, 1981. The worker was injured
at approximately 2:00 p.m. on February 12, 1981, and was fired at approximately 3:30 p.m. The worker brought a suit against his employer for wrongful discharge. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employer,
and the worker appealed.
On appeal the employer contended that a decision to fire the worker had
been made before his injury. Further, since the worker had not taken steps
to file a workers' compensation claim the Act's provisions did not apply.
The Hunt court reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for trial,
holding that the worker could maintain an action for wrongful discharge if
there was a causal connection between his workers' compensation claim and
his termination even if it were not the sole reason he was fired.' 27 The court
held that a fact issue existed as to whether the workers' compensation claim
contributed to the employer's ultimate decision to fire the worker. 1 28 The
court further held that the legislative purpose of section 8307c of the Act is
to allow workers to claim benefits to which they are entitled under the Act
without fear of reprisal in the form of termination.1 29 Thus, to advance this
in which the empurpose this provision of the Act may apply to situations
130
ployee is fired before filing his claim for compensation.
In Van Tran Electric Corp. v. Thomas13 1 a worker sought and obtained a
judgment that included exemplary damages against his employer for having
discharged him in violation of article 8307c after his filing of a workers'
121. 707 S.W.2d at 241.
122. Id.
123. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § I (Vernon Supp. 1987).
124. Id. § 2.

125. Id.
126. 711 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
127. Id. at 79.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 80 (citing Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. 1980); Texas
Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
130. Id. (citing Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111, 115-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
131. 708 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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compensation claim. The Act provides that a person who violates article
8307c is liable for reasonable damages suffered by the employee as a result of
the violation. 132 The Thomas court affirmed the judgment in the worker's
of reasonable damages
favor, holding that article 8307c authorizes the award
133
and as such is not restricted to actual damages.
The Texas Supreme Court considered the question of whether article
8307c is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act 34 in the case of
Ruiz v. Miller Curtain Co. 135 Following a discussion of the preemption doctrine originating from the supremacy clause of the United States Constitu137
tion 136 and the pertinent provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, 138
the court concluded that federal law did not preempt the Texas statute.
The court noted that the Texas workers' compensation system does not involve labor union functions or collective bargaining and that the filing of a
of conworkers' compensation benefits claim does not constitute the type 139
Act.
Relations
Labor
National
the
by
contemplated
activity
certed
XII. ATTORNEY'S FEES
In cases for death benefits in which the carrier fails to admit liability prior
to the final award of the Board, or disputes liability after such an award, the
Act authorizes the court to award a lump sum for attorney's fees not to
exceed twenty-five percent of the beneficiary's recovery.Y40 The Act further
provides that upon settlement of a case in which the carrier admits liability
for the death but disputes the proper beneficiaries, attorney's fees shall be
paid periodically rather than in a lump sum.141
In Courtney v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association 142 a judgment was
entered awarding a widow workers' compensation death benefits and additionally awarding attorney's fees in a lump sum based upon twenty percent
of the present value of the future workers' compensation death benefits calculated according to the Widow's Pension Table. On appeal the use of the
Widow's Pension Table was attacked on several grounds. First, the future
weekly benefits are paid without discounting for the possibility of remarriage
and the provisions of the Act providing for lump sum attorney's fees based
upon such benefits make no provision for a discount for the possibility of
remarriage. 14 3 Secondly, the Widow's Pension Table, although discounted
for remarriage, does not take into account the two-year lump sum payment
132. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987).

133. 708 S.W.2d at 531.

134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982).
135. 702 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1985).
136. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (1982).

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

702 S.W.2d at 186.
Id. at 185.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8(d) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
Id.
709 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 779.
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to which the widow is entitled upon remarriage. 144 Third, the Widow's Pension Table is based on 1960 United States Life Tables for White Females and
the United States Employees' Compensation Remarriage Tables; the
Widow's Pension Table thus fails to take into account the increased life expectancy and decreased probability of remarriage that is reflected by more
current statistical tables. 14 5 Fourth, the Widow's Pension Table is based
upon statistical data utilizing a three and one-half percent discount rather
than the statutorily mandated four percent discount. 146 For these reasons,
the appellant urged that the present value of future benefits should be calculated by means of the United States 1978 Life Tables and such figures should
in turn be used to calculate the award of a lump sum of attorney's fees. The
Courtney court affirmed the trial court's judgment, noting that the award of
attorney's fees and the method of calculation is within the trial court's
7
discretion. 14
The Act provides that if a worker is injured under circumstances that give
rise to a cause of action against some person other than the employer, the
employee may proceed against that person, pursue a claim for compensation
under the Act, or both.148 If the worker pursues compensation under the
Act, the carrier is subrogated to the worker's rights against the third
party. 1 4 9 If the worker recovers in the third-party action, the Act entitles
the carrier to reimbursement for previously paid medical expenses.' 50 The
Act treats any recovery in excess of that amount as a credit against future
benefits for compensation and medical benefit payments for which the carrier would otherwise be liable.151
These benefits are usually received by the carrier as a result of the attorney's efforts in pursuing the worker's claim against the third party. Since the
carrier has usually not agreed to compensate the worker's attorney for his
efforts, and since the carrier is sometimes represented by its own attorney,
the Act contains provisions allowing the court to award attorney's fees to the
worker's attorney for his efforts in recovering the carrier's subrogation interest. 152 The fee is paid out of the carrier's portion of the recovery and cannot
1 53
exceed one-third of its interest.
In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Dean 154 an injured worker
recovered under the Act and then pursued a third-party claim. A lawsuit
was filed against the third-party defendant, and the case settled without the
carrier's knowledge. The trial court awarded the worker's attorney onethird of the carrier's subrogation claim. Upon learning of these events the
Id.; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
709 S.W.2d at 780.
Id.
Id.
148. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
149. Id.
144.
145.
146.
147.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. § 6a(c).
Id.
Id. § 6a(a), (b).
Id. § 6a(b).

154. 697 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no writ).
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carrier had the cause of action reinstated, filed a plea in intervention, and
unsuccessfully attempted to set aside the award of attorney's fees. On appeal
the court held that section 6a is applicable to those circumstances in which
the carrier's interest is not actively represented in obtaining the recovery
from the third party and that section1 6a
entitled the worker's attorney to
55
attorney's fees in the amount granted.
In those situations in which the carrier retains its own attorney to represent its subrogation interests during the third party action, the trial court
must divide the attorneys' fees allowable out of the carrier's subrogation recovery between the carrier's attorney and the worker's attorney. 15 6 A
number of cases have considered the factors that the trial court must take
1 57
into account in apportioning the attorneys' fees between such attorneys.
These cases reveal that the trial court must first determine if the subrogation
attorney actively participated in the case, and if so, then assess the contributions of each attorney in actually obtaining the recovery.
In The University of Texas System v. Melchor1 58 the university alleged
that the trial court had erred in apportioning approximately eighty-five percent of the attorneys' fees available from the subrogation recovery to the
worker's attorney and only fifteen percent to the university's attorney. In
affirming the trial court's apportionment of attorneys' fees, the appellate
court noted that in a case of contested liability the subrogation attorney does
not actively participate in a case by simply filing the necessary intervention
papers and reviewing pleadings.1 59 The court considered the fact that the
worker's attorney had conducted all pre-trial discovery, handled pre-trial
motions, incurred substantial expenses in preparing the case, and assumed
responsibility for negotiating the settlement with the third party. The court
noted that it was the action of the worker's attorney that securedthe recovery of the subrogation amount and that it was unlikely that the university
would have recovered any of its subrogation interest solely upon the work
that was done by its subrogation attorney. 16 0 The Melchor court set forth
three factors that the trial court should take into consideration in matters of
contested liability where the carrier is actively represented by its own attorney: the degree of participation requested of the subrogation attorney by the
worker's attorney; whether such requests by the worker's attorney were reasonable; and the degree to which the subrogation attorney responded to
155. Id. at 472; see Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Plessner, 682 S.W.2d 650, 652-653 (Tex.

App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
156. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a(b) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
157. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Branton & Mendelsohn, Inc., 670 S.W.2d 699, 702-704 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ); Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. Metcalf, 642 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Union Carbide Corp. v. Burton, 618 S.W.2d 410, 416
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); International Ins. Co. v. Burnett &
Adhers, Assocs., 601 S.W.2d 199, 201-202 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Stuebing, 594 S.W.2d 565, 567-568 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lee v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 534 S.W.2d 392, 394-396 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
158. 696 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
159. Id. at 409.
160. Id. at 408.
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these requests. 16 1 The Melchor court further held that the worker's attorney
need not submit a detailed account of time expended and hourly rate
charged in order to justify his fees under section 6a, but may rely upon a
contingent fee agreement in establishing his entitlement to a part or all of the
statutory fee allowed out of the subrogated recovery. 162
At the conclusion 'of the third-party action the Act treats any recovery in
excess of the amount necessary to reimburse the carrier for past benefits as a
credit against future benefits for compensation and medical benefit payments
for which the carrier would otherwise be liable. 163 In awarding attorney's
fees to the worker's attorney for obtaining the carrier's subrogated interest,
the court must take into account the true benefit to the carrier, which would
include liability for future payments of which the carrier has been relieved. 164 In McCollum v. Baylor University Medical Center 16 5 the court
considered the question of a worker's attorney's right to an attorney's fee
under the Act when a third-party claim was concluded and the carrier had
paid no benefits to the worker.
In McCollum the carrier denied that the worker's injury had occurred in
the course and scope of employment. While the compensation case was
pending, the worker brought suit against the third-party tortfeasor and settled the third-party action. The carrier filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the worker's settlement would exceed any amount for
which the carrier might potentially be liable. The trial court granted the
motion and entered judgment against the worker. The appellate court reversed and remanded the compensation case for trial. 166
The McCollum court held that the issue of the carrier's liability under the
Act must be tried in order to determine the extent that the third party settlement benefitted the carrier. 167 When the extent of the carrier's liability, if
any, is determined, the worker's attorney is then owed attorney's fees from
the carrier for his services in having obtained the settlement of the thirdparty claim. The reasoning of the McCollum court prevents a worker's attorney from being denied compensation for his services that accrued to the
benefit of a carrier in those cases in which the carrier has paid no benefits
prior to the conclusion of the third-party claim.
Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Keenom 168 involved an appeal
in a workers' compensation death case in which attorney's fees were
awarded. Before the case was tried, the beneficiaries settled their claim
against a third party responsible for the worker's death. Subsequently the
workers' compensation suit was tried, and a verdict was rendered in favor of
161. Id. at 409.
162. Id. at 408.
163. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a(c) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
164. Chambers v. Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 693 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
165. 697 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
166. Id. at 26.
167. Id. at 25.
168. 716 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the beneficiaries. The judgment entered by the trial court included attorney's fees equal to twenty-five percent of the total amount of undiscounted
compensation benefits owed to the beneficiaries after allowing recoupment
for the funds received from the third-party settlement. 169 The judgment
further awarded attorney's fees in an amount equal to twenty-five percent of
1 70
the third-party settlement for which the carrier had obtained credit.
The carrier contended that attorney's fees should not have been awarded
from the credit that the carrier received due to the third party settlement.
The claimant's counsel contended that the same result should be reached
whether his efforts benefitted the carrier by a credit or by the recoupment of
a subrogation interest. The worker's counsel relied upon the decisions of
McCollum v. Baylor University Medical Center 171 and Metropolitan Transit
Authority v. Plessner 172.
In Plessnerseveral injured workers recovered under the Act and then pursued third-party claims that were settled prior to the filing of a lawsuit. The
carrier filed suit for declaratory judgment 173 seeking a declaration that the
provisions of the Act entitling the workers' attorneys to attorney's fees were
inapplicable when a lawsuit had not been filed. The Plessnercourt held that
section 6a is applicable whether the subrogated interest is obtained through
settlement prior to or subsequent to filing of suit. 174 The court noted that to

hold otherwise would result in an unreasonable interpretation that would
require workers' attorneys to file lawsuits immediately on claims involving a
subrogation interest or to perform work on a claim for which they would not
receive compensation. 175 The Keenom court adopted the analysis and reasoning of the Plessner and McCollum decisions in holding that an award of
attorney's fees to the worker's attorney from the credit that the carrier re76
ceived from the third-party recovery was proper.1
The carrier in Keenom further argued that an award of a lump sum of
attorney's fees based on the total amount of undiscounted compensation
benefits was in error. 177 In rejecting this argument the court noted that
prior decisions have held that attorney's fees paid in a lump sum are not
subject to the statutory discount mandated in other circumstances. 178 The
Keenom court affirmed the trial court's award of a lump sum of attorney's
79
fee based on the total amount of undiscounted compensation benefits.'
In The City of Garland v. Huston 180 the city appealed the trial court's
169. Id. at 60.
170. Id.
171. 697 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ), discussed supra notes 165-67 and
accompanying text.
172. 682 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
173. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2524-1 (Vernon 1965).

174.
175.
176.
177.

682 S.W.2d at 563.
Id.
716 S.W.2d at 63.
Id. at 64.

178. Id. at 65; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306a (Vernon 1967).

179. 716 S.W.2d at 66.
180. 702 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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allocation of attorney's fees pursuant to article 8307, section 6a. 181 The city
contended that the worker's attorney could not have represented the city in
obtaining its subrogation interest because it would have created a conflict of
interest between the carrier and the worker. The city further contended that
since the worker's attorney did not file a full written disclosure statement
acknowledged by the claimant as required by the Act, 182 the worker's attorney was not entitled to any fees. The Huston court noted that the worker's
attorney was entitled to a fee pursuant to section 6a as a result of benefit
accruing to the city as a result of his service, not as a result of representation
of the carrier.' 83 Since the worker's attorney's entitlement to the fee under
factual situations such as before the Huston court was not as a result of
representing the carrier, the Act's written disclosure requirement was
inapplicable. 184
The Act regulates attorney's fees for representing a workers' compensation claimant. 185 In Martin v. Travelers Indemnity Co. 186 a worker's attorney sought to recover attorney's fees under the Texas attorney's fee
statute1 87 in addition to those authorized by the Act. The Martin court
adopted the reasoning of Prudential Insurance Company of America v.
Burke' 8 8 and held that the intent of the legislature was to exclude from
article 2226 claims in which attorney's fees were otherwise recoverable
under the Act. 189 The Martin court held that the provisions of the Act
regulating attorneys' fees would operate to bring claims under the Act
within the purview of the exclusionary language of article 2226.190
XIII.

EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY

Employers are not required to carry workers' compensation coverage in
the State of Texas. Generally, however, those employers who do carry
181. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1987).
182. The Act requires:
In any case where the claimant's attorney is also representing the subrogated
association, a full written disclosure must be made to the claimant, prior to
actual employment by the association as an attorney, and acknowledged by the
claimant, and a signed copy of the same furnished to all concerned parties and
made a part of the file in the Industrial Accident Board. A copy of the disclosure with authorization and consent, shall also be filed with the claimant's
pleadings prior to any judgment entered and approved by the court. Unless the
claimant's attorney complies with all of the requirements as prescribed in this
section, the attorney shall not be entitled to receive any of the fees prescribed in
this section to which he would be entitled pursuant to an agreement with the
association.
Id. § 6a(a).
183. 702 S.W.2d at 699.
184. Id.

185. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 7c-7d (Vernon 1967).
186. 696 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
187. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (repealed 1985) (now
codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 38.001-.006 (Vernon 1986)).
188. 614 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. App.-Texarkana), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 621 S.W.2d 596
(Tex. 1981).

189. 696 S.W.2d at 451 (citing Burke, 614 S.W.2d at 850).
190. Id.
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workers' compensation are protected from common law liability for damages sustained by their employees. 19 1 Employers who choose not to carry
workers' compensation are known as nonsubscribers and are subject to common law actions for damages brought by their employees and their common
law defenses to such actions are removed by the Act.' 92 In Port Royal Development Corp. v. Braselton Construction Co. 193 an employee of a subcontractor on a construction site sustained injuries and brought a claim against
the general contractor. The general contractor impleaded the worker's employer for indemnity. The employer obtained an instructed verdict against
the general contractor, from which the general contractor appealed.
The general contractor contended that the employer's immunity under the
Act did not apply to bar enforcement of an indemnity agreement between an
employer and a third party when the agreement was executed before the
employee's injury. 194 The court agreed with the general contractor's theory,
but noted that the general rule followed in Texas is that an indemnity contract will not protect a party against his own negligence unless the agreement unequivocably expresses this obligation.195 The court noted the Texas
Supreme Court's statement that Texas has progressed as near as judicially
possible to the express negligence rule without actually adopting it and
thereby requiring all parties to state that they intend to hold one harmless
from liability for his own negligence. 196 The court then held that the particular indemnity agreement in question was not sufficient to indemnify the
197
general contractor for its own negligence.
In the case of Davis v. Sinclair Refining Co. 198 an employee sought to hold
his employer, a subscriber to the Act, liable for common law damages for the
injuries he sustained by asserting that his employer had assumed a third
party's liability. The worker's contention was predicated upon the corporate
merger statutes. 199 This article provides that when two corporations merge,
the merging corporation ceases to exist and the surviving corporation becomes responsible for all liabilities and obligations of the merging corporation. 200 In the facts before the court, the worker's employer was the
surviving corporation and the third party tortfeasor was the merging
corporation.
The Davis court noted that Texas had previously rejected the dual capacity doctrine under which an employer was liable to his employee if he acted
191. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967); id. §§ 3a, 5 (Vernon Supp.
1987).

192. Id. §§ 1, 4 (Vernon 1967).
193. 716 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
194. Id. at 632.
195. Id.

196. Id. at 632 (citing Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 490
S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1972)). Subsequent to the court of appeals opinion Texas adopted the

express negligence doctrine. See Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Construction Co., 725 S.W.2d 705
(Tex. 1987).

197. 716 S.W.2d at 633.
198. 704 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
199. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 5.06 (Vernon 1980).
200. Id.
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in a capacity that rendered him liable apart from his primary capacity as
employer. 20 1 The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the employer, stating that the Texas corporate statute does not alter the public policy expressed in the Act. 20 2 In a well reasoned dissenting opinion the court
urged that Texas adopt the dual capacity doctrine when an employer stands
20 3
in the shoes of a third-party tortfeasor.
The statutory beneficiaries of a worker whose death results from the gross
negligence of the worker's employer may pursue a common law cause of
action for exemplary damages against the employer even though the employer is a subscriber to the Act. 2° 4 In Wright v. Gifford Hill & Co. 205 a
surviving spouse sought exemplary damages against her deceased husband's
employer under the Act. The jury found gross negligence, proximate cause,
and exemplary damages, but no issues were submitted on actual damages.
The trial court entered judgment n.o.v. in favor of the employer. On appeal
it was argued that the workers' compensation death benefits had been conclusively proven at trial and represented a finding of actual damages. In
affirming the trial court's judgment, the court of appeals held that workers'
compensation benefits are not actual damages, which must be found before
exemplary damages can be recovered. 20 6 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and held that it is not necessary
for a plaintiff to secure jury findings of actual damages in order to recover
exemplary damages in a wrongful death case arising under article 8306, sec2
tion 5.
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In Glisson v. General Cinema Corp.208 the parents of a deceased worker
sought to recovery exemplary damages under article 8306, section 5. 209
Summary judgment was granted in favor of the employer because parents
are not beneficiaries entitled to exemplary damages under the Act. 2 10 The
Glisson court noted that although the parents are legal beneficiaries entitled
to death benefits under the Act, 21 1 section 5 does not create a cause of action, but merely provides that the Act does not preclude recovery specifically
provided for by the Texas Constitution under article XVI, section 26.212
Parents are not beneficiaries under article XVI, section 26 of the Texas Constitution and, thus, are not permitted to recover exemplary damages under
article 8306, section 5 of the Act. 213
201. 704 S.W.2d at 415. The employers' dual capacity doctrine as addressed by the Davis
court must be distinguished from the employees' dual capacity doctrine discussed supra note
76.
202. 704 S.W.2d at 415.

203. Id. at 416-22.
204. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967).
205. 705 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986), rev'd, 725 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1987).

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 871.
725 S.W.2d at 714.
713 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967).
713 S.W.2d at 694.
Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8 (Vernon 1967).
713 S.W.2d at 695; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 26.
713 S.W.2d at 697.

